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This article describes two of the principal roots allowing the expression of emotions and feel-
ings in Dalabon, an endangered language of South-Western Arnhem Land. The first root,
kangu, ‘belly’, is depicted linguistically as the location of emotions induced by interpersonal
relationships. The belly is thus presented as the locus of good and bad moods generally and
of conflict more specifically. Furthermore, the material properties of the belly—its fluidity in
particular—impact on one’s temper and ability to deal with others in an ideologically pre-
scribed manner. Speakers describe ritual manipulations undertaken on the belly of young
infants in order to shape their temper. Kangu-no may thus be described as a malleable inter-
face between the person and the outside world, principally other people. The second root,
yolh, may at first sight translate as ‘feelings’, either good or bad, but also means ‘appetite’,
‘drive’, ‘pep’. Yolh-no is associated with the most intimate part of the person, one’s own aspi-
rations that are independent of interactions with others. Although yolh-no connotes the core
self and kangu-no, the belly, connotes relatedness to others, they are conceived as physiologi-
cally connected, so that material properties of the belly impact on the self. Thus, the semantic
analysis of Dalabon, along with related anthropological observations, unveils an explicit con-
ceptual and cultural attention to the distinction between emotions and feelings (as respec-
tively defined in the article) and to the autonomy of the person within a constraining social
framework. The article shows how this concern echoes and challenges both anthropological
and philosophical considerations.
INTRODUCTION
Emotions and feelings attract several well-differentiated trends of interpretation
within the social sciences. Within philosophy, emotions have been explored by a
number of prominent philosophers from Aristotle to Russell, including Descartes,
Hume and many more. Early psychology produced its own distinctive theories, as
did neuroscience later on (Damasio 1999, 2003). Anthropology and linguistic
anthropology have also explored emotions and have continuously reflected on the
notion of the person (see Marriott 1968; Strathern 1988) neighbouring research on
emotions proper (see Myers 1979, 1986, 1988; Lutz 1987; Wierzbicka 1999).
For the Australian region, Myers’s (1979) and (1986) studies of Pintupi are
among the best anthropological descriptions of emotions. Myers (1986) in particular
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depicts the ‘emotional landscape’1 of the Pintupi group from the Western Desert,
providing fine interconnected definitions of the major emotions. He thoroughly
describes their conceptual, cultural and social properties and the moral order they
shape. As an ethnolinguist, my interests concentrate on the language of emotions.
Within the Dalabon group,2 such analysis requires examination of Kriol as well as
Dalabon, as Kriol is effectively the everyday language. I have observed several
emotional behaviours and concepts that do resemble the ones depicted by Myers
(1979), and there are reasons to anticipate that such a study would uncover a compa-
rable (albeit not identical) ‘emotional landscape’. Hence, a complete study of emo-
tional patterns within their social context should consider Kriol patterns. However,
the semantics of emotions in Dalabon remains relevant, as it reveals specific features
that are either absent or obscured in Kriol. In fact, analysing the semantics of emo-
tions in Dalabon opens up new insights into the conceptions of emotions and feelings
that underlie the speech of Dalabon speakers, and we shall find that such observations
echo Myers’s interpretations. Indeed, Myers (1979) states that such discussions are
often a source of confusion. He refers to a dichotomy between feelings defined as
personal, non-observable private states vs. emotions as articulated, observable, public
concepts framed within a cultural system. The following paragraphs spell out various
aspects of this complex distinction.
Emotions and feelings have received different treatments in various disciplines.
Neuroscientists conceive of emotions as bodily electro-chemical reactions, resulting
from environmental stimuli or from representations triggered by memory. Damasio
(1999) argues that emotions are not cognitive: they can take place without the per-
son being physiologically aware of them. Feelings are the knowledge of these emo-
tions: they are the private, cognitive counterparts of emotions.3 Neuroscientists
focus on the biological nature of emotions, thus stressing their universality. This
physicalist view pays little attention to the sociocultural dimension of emotions. As
a result, social scientists, anthropologists in particular, have developed a different
conception whereby emotions should be understood in their social context. An
emotion is thus defined as a type of reaction adapted to a particular situation. Both
the situation and the reaction may be defined and described in terms of social
configurations, varying across cultures. In this conception, emotions are publicly
defined and displayed; feelings are, again, the private counterpart of observable
emotions. As an anthropologist, Myers adopts this second stance.
At first sight, these definitions of emotions sound different, if not contradic-
tory.4 What is common to both theoretical dichotomies presented previously, how-
ever, is the observable nature of emotions, as opposed to the private, unobservable
nature of feelings. Emotions are consistently conceived of as an interface between
the person and the rest of the world, the observable part of a phenomenon that
involves a private sequence (called ‘feelings’), happening strictly within the person.
In his Philosophical Investigations (1953), Wittgenstein criticises this distinction. He
opposes the ‘grammatical confusion’—a confusion about the way language works—
that leads us to believe that when talking about feelings, we refer to actual events we
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could treat as objects of reference. Wittgenstein (1953)’s famous parabola compares
this would-be private object to a beetle that each one of us would keep enclosed in
a secret box:
§293: Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No one
can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by
looking at his beetle […] The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at
all; not even as a something […].
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model
of ‘object and designation’, the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
Our inclination to refer to private states within our language games is the result
of a grammatical misunderstanding, whereby we hold private states to be real objects
of reference. The ‘beetle’ ‘cancels out’ because our world is entirely woven within
what Wittgenstein calls language games: the idea of a private language is incoherent.
This is Wittgenstein’s way of discarding a culturally specific confusion, the pervasive
Western mind ⁄body dichotomy. While Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist, he holds
that human phenomena take place entirely within language—language being
altogether social, rational, natural, even biological and thus indifferent to the mind ⁄
body dichotomy. Hence, the idea of referring to private objects makes no sense.
Wittgenstein’s criticism encompasses both conceptions of the emotions ⁄ feelings pair,
as both the physicalist and the ‘culturalist’ conception try to articulate something
about the private counterpart of observable phenomena.
Myers’s reluctance to discuss feelings, which he spelt out in his 1988 article,
takes Wittgenstein’s warnings into account. One of Myers’s points is that, as
opposed to classical ⁄ common sense Western views (Lutz 1986), emotions should
not be classified as being opposed to reason and concepts. Instead, following a
Wittgensteinian trend,5 Myers argues that emotions should be understood as cultur-
ally articulated, rational concepts, operating without reference to unarticulated, irra-
tional, private feelings. Throughout his writings, Myers convincingly shows that
Pintupi emotions can be described as discursive, rational concepts, relating to one
another within a wider social context and world view. Myers’s reluctance to discuss
feelings also results from a concern expressed by Lutz (1987) in her study of the Ifa-
luk system, when she concludes that her article is not ‘intended as a model of how
the Ifaluk ‘‘think about their feelings’’’, because the ‘concern with ‘‘true, underlying
feeling(s)’’ is a local cultural preoccupation’ specific to ‘Euroamerican cultural
constructions’. Tackling the issue of private feelings amounts to imposing Western
values and concerns. Myers’s attitude towards feelings both matches Wittgenstein’s
criticism of Western conceptions of language, especially his reference to private feel-
ings, and is associated with the same (self-)criticism of Western culture as Lutz’s.
But Myers’s desire to avoid imposing Western values takes him one step further:
Myers (1979) argues that the Pintupi moral ideal consists in minimising individuals’
private inputs by assigning radical moral priority to the public sphere—that is, to
Aspects of the semantics of emotions and feelings in Dalabon
ª 2010 Australian Anthropological Society 369
emotions against feelings: ‘The ideology of emotions [in the Pintupi cultural
system] can be read almost as a moral text against the wrongness of private wilful-
ness’ (alluding to Stanner). On the other hand, in Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self
(Myers 1986), the author insists on the importance of individual autonomy—which
connects with private feelings. This is not contradictory, as he explains that this
tension between personal autonomy and relatedness to others is precisely the
cornerstone of the Pintupi social order.
While I applaud Myers’s description of the Pintupi ‘emotional landscape’, and
his qualification of emotions as articulated, social concepts, I have reservations
about his treatment of feelings. These reservations stem from my observations of
the semantic structure of the domain of emotions and feelings in Dalabon, in con-
nection with speakers’ views and with culture-specific situations. I use the terms
‘emotions’ and ‘feelings’ here in the broad sense defined earlier in the text: emo-
tions are an interface between the person and the world; feelings are conceived of as
cognitive and thus private. These concepts may not necessarily be transferred to
another cultural system in an identical way. However, we shall see that this termi-
nology is not inappropriate in the case of Dalabon discourse and folk theories. Con-
trasting with Myers’s descriptions of the Pintupi, the question of the partition
between culturally framed emotional experiences and bare, strictly private experi-
ences does seem to be an issue of concern for Dalabon speakers and therefore a
topic worth studying. In addition, while Dalabon moral values do put a strong
emphasis on sharing, they do not seem to discard the private sphere.
In Dalabon, two roots seem to structure the expression of emotions and feelings.
We will first explore the semantic values of kangu, the belly, which may be understood
as the site and medium of interpersonal emotions, and further, as a malleable interface
between the person and the outside world. The second morpheme, yolh, refers to per-
sonal, private feelings. Far from being ethically dismissed, it is explicitly regarded as
the expression of the self and its autonomy. Kangu and yolh are not disconnected
from each other. In fact, it seems that one’s yolh-no may be reached and transformed
via the materiality of the belly. And we shall see that this interaction between kangu
and yolh also sheds some light on the ‘beetle issue’ mentioned previously.
CONTEXT AND METHOD
As I challenge the question of private feelings in an Australian Aboriginal culture,
dismissed by Myers (1979) as a vexed topic, it is particularly important to hear his
warnings about the difficulty of this subject. Emotions and feelings involve entan-
gled affects and ideologies, and the risk of extrapolating on fragile bases, of distort-
ing foreign conceptions and inadvertently adjusting them to our own, is particularly
acute. My argument is essentially grounded on a concrete, easily analysable linguis-
tic corpus. My thorough knowledge of the Dalabon social framework and daily
lives, built upon my living among the Dalabon community for several years, helps
interpretations.
M. Ponsonnet
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The corpus consists of about 30 h of recorded and fully transcribed conversa-
tions between myself and Dalabon speakers or semi-speakers on the topic of laws,
reason, the mind, the self, emotions, feelings and interpersonal relationships in
Dalabon and Kriol. These recordings were collected between 2007 and 2008 in
South-Western Arnhem Land (Weemol, Beswick).6
Kriol is a well-developed creole widely identified as Aboriginal by its speakers.
Numbering at least 20,000 native speakers across Northern Australia, it is the pre-
dominant mother tongue of the communities of the South-Western Arnhem region.
Dalabon, a non-Pama-Nyungan prefixing language of the same region, within the
Gunwinyguan family,7 is a highly endangered language numbering fewer than ten
speakers at the time of writing, making it difficult to document in context as an
orthodox methodology would require. A good way to document Dalabon is there-
fore to conduct interviews with the best speakers, encouraging them to tell stories,
anecdotes, opinions and to articulate metalinguistic statements—explanations of all
sorts and translations in Kriol (or English). Most interviewees being at least bilin-
gual, the corpus is a mix of Dalabon and Kriol, with some English. In the case of
emotions and feelings, most of the materials, and all the quotes except two, are
drawn from conversations with two female interlocutors, out of six main speakers
involved in this project.
Such a corpus may be deemed imperfect when compared to the standards of
non-endangered language documentation. But because such ‘imperfections’ cannot
be avoided with endangered languages, I suggest that one should rely on the obstacles
mentioned previoulsy, instead of fancying a ‘perfect’ corpus. Rather than considering
the interviews as ‘artificial’, I re-claim research-oriented conversations as a ‘genuine’
context where Dalabon is still spoken. Additionally, metalinguistic statements are use-
ful considering my interests. What I seek to understand via the semantics of Dalabon
is how speakers conceive of their own words, statements and concepts—that is, their
conceptual ‘models’ (Quinn & Holland 1987).8 Metalinguistic statements teach us a
lot about these models. Kriol translations convey important information about speak-
ers’ understanding of Dalabon (Ponsonnet 2009). As a result of this methodology,
the exact anthropological context of Dalabon expressions cannot be fully described,
simply because it has not been fully recreated. The real context of the quotes is the
research-oriented conversations, where they are included in an anecdote, for example.
This cannot compare to the rich, real situations that anthropologists often use as
examples, but my knowledge of the social context and of the speakers’ personal back-
ground helps my interpretation. The quotes presented later are representative of a
number of occurrences in the corpus (two sound occurrences, at a minimum). In this
framework, the glosses and translations presented later in the text result from my
own accumulated and cross-checked knowledge of Dalabon language and social back-
ground. Whenever useful, I present both literal and free translations, in order to
make the translation and glossing processes more transparent.
There is a ‘gender bias’ in my corpus for this topic. Indeed, female Dalabon
speakers talked more about emotions and interpersonal relationships than male
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speakers did. This could reflect a gender partition of interests and activities. While
emotions and feelings are by no means ‘secret’ topics,9 one of women’s major
responsibilities is to look after children and family in general. This involves paying
a lot of attention to emotions, as they result from interactions with others. Hence,
this gender bias may be a consequence of a structural feature of the regional culture
rather than an imperfection. There is little literature about emotions and feelings in
languages of this region, apart from Evans (2007) and Ponsonnet (2009). Conse-
quently, my analyses rely essentially on the corpus described earlier, on my observa-
tions of social behaviours and on my knowledge of the Dalabon group’s cultural
scenarios, standards and values.
THE SEMANTICS OF EMOTIONS AND FEELINGS IN DALABON
Dalabon has a limited number of nouns to refer to emotions and feelings. Verbs
and adjectives are more frequent. Dalabon is highly polysynthetic: lexemes are made
of morphemes (sometimes many of them) that can be used in a number of different
lexemes. Morphemes are often understood by speakers as conveying a fairly con-
stant meaning, even when they are used within seemingly lexicalised, compound
forms. A large number of lexemes expressing feelings and ⁄or emotions use two focal
roots, kangu and yolh, which can be approximated to ‘belly’ and ‘feelings’, respec-
tively. Kangu and yolh are not strictly bound morphemes: they can also stand as
nouns. However, they do not appear alone. Just like a number of Dalabon nouns—-
body parts in particular—they obligatorily bear a suffix, in this case, the possessive
suffix.10 Hence, one cannot use kangu or yolh alone, but must say kangu-no, ‘his ⁄her
belly’, kangu-ngu, ‘your belly’, yolh-ngan, ‘my feelings’, etc. I will use the default
third person singular forms kangu-no and yolh-no to designate the nouns. Kangu
and yolh will designate the roots. I will start by describing the respective uses and
semantic values of kangu ⁄ kangu-no on the one hand, yolh ⁄ yolh-no on the other
hand, in order to understand their meaning, functions and status in comparison
with each other.
KANGU
Kangu-no as a body part
Kangu-no refers to various body parts located in the abdominal region. The
root kangu may thus be used to form lexemes that have nothing to do with emotions
or temper. The verb kangu-barmu, for instance, means ‘to sleep on belly’, where
kangu seems to refer to an external body part. But pregnant women may also be
described as carrying a child ‘in their kangu-no’, showing that kangu-no may also
be construed as a container, maybe akin to an internal organ. Five of the six speakers,
when asked to point at kangu-no on the drawing of a male human body where
organs were apparent (as in local ‘X-ray style’ painting), identified a central area just
below the lungs, where the stomach is.11 This may indicate that kangu-no is
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consciously construed as an internal organ, probably the stomach. Kangu-no is thus
polysemic, meaning (possibly among other things) the belly, the stomach, or
‘abdominal container’. Because belly in English conveys the ‘container’ connotation,
I will translate kangu-no with the broader term ‘belly’ along the article.
Emotions and feelings for others
Kangu appears within a number of compound verbs expressing one’s emotional
state, typically in relation to persons. The verb kangu-darrmu,12 for instance, was
used to describe the feelings of ‘missing someone’. We also find kangu-kurduhmu
(kangu + ‘be stuck’), often more specifically ‘be stuck in an uncomfortable
situation’, cf. Ponsonnet (forthcoming), and kangu-run, (kangu + ‘cry’). They are
both used in example (1) to refer to an interpersonal emotional state, in this
context as ‘worry about someone’, ‘feel sorrow about someone’.
(1)13 Bah malung wujbidul kaye-ninj nunh





Lit. ‘But before, when she was in hospital, then I used to be belly-uncomfortable about her,
I would be belly-crying about her all the time.’
Free ‘But before, when she was in hospital, then I used to worry about her I would keep
feeling sorrow about her all the time.’
Kangu can also be used in verbs expressing positive (or improving) feelings, as
in example (2).
(2) Ngah-lng-kangu-mon-minj kah-marne-dudjminj wujbidul-walung.
I-then-kangu-good-become:PI him>me-BENEF-return:PP hospital-ELAT
Lit. ‘Then my belly got better, as she came back to me, from hospital.’
Free ‘Then I felt better, as she came back to me, from hospital.’
Many more verbs or adjectives can be formed on the same pattern, associating
kangu with another morpheme in order to describe emotions. Kangu-no, the belly,
is represented linguistically as the locus of these emotions, or their medium, the
organ that gets affected in one way or another when one experiences emotional pain
or relief. An inventory of these lexemes would lead us to identify and describe
typical emotions, their nature and social context, just as Myers (1979) did in the
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Pintupi context—but this is not the topic of this article. It is worth mentioning,
however, that in my corpus, compounds including kangu were nearly always used to
describe feelings ⁄ emotions triggered by interpersonal relationships. It thus seems that
emotions related to other human beings—the kind of emotions emphasised by
Myers—are associated with this root. While the number of occurrences is too low to
be fully conclusive, we will find other reasons to think that kangu is primarily
associated with interactions with the outer environment, including interpersonal
situations—the latter being, in this cultural context, a major dimension of the former.
Moods
Kangu is also used to describe people’s moods, such as their bellicose or peaceful atti-
tudes towards others. Typically, kangu-mon (kangu + ‘good’) means ‘to be in a good dis-
position towards someone’, as opposed to being angry against this person, seeking
conflict with him or her:
(3) Bukah-dja-marne-kangu-mon.
he>him.high-just-BENEF-kangu-good
Si, laik Franc¸ois im stil gud la yu, im don graul yu bobala.
See, like Franc¸ois he still good with you he neg argue:PR you interj
Lit. ‘He’s now good belly for her. See, Franc¸ois for instance, he’s still good with you, he
doesn’t argue with you, good man!’
Free ‘He’s now well disposed towards her. See, Franc¸ois for instance, he’s still good with
you, he doesn’t argue with you, good man!’
Kangu-weh (kangu + ‘bad’) is the symmetrical counterpart of kangu-mon, as
shown in example (4), where the speaker provides defining explanations of the dif-
ference between several expressions using kangu. Her definition shows how emo-
tions described using kangu are closely associated with interpersonal relationships,
here verbal communication.
(4) Yang bulah-marne-yenjdjung nunh mah wirrih kah-lng-kangu-weh-mun.
speech.content they>him-BENEF-talk:PR this but or he-then-kangu-bad-become:PR
Nunh mah wirrih bulah-marne-yenjdjung nunh kah-kangu-burrama-mun.
This thus or they>him-BENEF-talk:PR this he-kangu-good-become:PR
Lit. ‘Either they speak out their views to each other, or if not then his belly gets bad. But
in the case they talk to each other, then his belly gets fine.’
Free ‘Either they speak out their views to each other, or if not then he feels bad, they are
in a bad mood. But in the case they talk to each other, then he feels good.’
M. Ponsonnet
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Structurally equivalent forms, gudbinji (literally ‘good belly’) and nogudbinji,
exist in Kriol, showing that speakers do, to some extent, endorse the actual implica-
tion of body parts in the phenomena at stake (see below). All these senses also
apply to kangu-mon and kangu-weh.
(5) Yinbala polodjais gija na.
you.two apologise:PR RECIP now
Yinbala gudbinji. Im gudbinji en yu gudbinji bla im.
you.two gudbinji he gudbinji and you gudbinji DAT him
Lit. ‘You two apologise to each other. You two are good belly. He’s good belly and
you are good belly towards him.’
Free ‘You two apologise to each other. You two are in a good mood again. He’s
well disposed and you are well disposed towards him.’
Conflict
As indicated by the reference to apology in example (5), binji and kangu connote
conflict. Kangu-mon (and kangu-weh) can be associated with fairly violent situations
involving actual ‘fight’—rather than just bad moods and petty arguments. The
adjective kangu-yirru-mon, kangu + ‘fight’ + ‘good’, can be used to describe a belli-
cose and aggressive person or animal. The expression kangu-nguddu-bakka conveys
the idea of surrender—succumbing to a disease, for instance. One may also use
nguddu-bakka alone. Adding kangu does not seem to amend the sense of the expres-
sion; it simply spells out the site where this internal fight takes place. In example
(6), the speaker explicitly locates a conflict in one’s stomach. She does so in spite of
her qualifying the conflict at stake as an intellectual one14 in the first part of the
sentence, using the verb kodj-wokarrun, literally ‘talk to oneself in the head’, or
‘wonder’, ‘be in a dilemma’. Nonetheless the event, as a conflict, is located inside
one’s stomach. Kangu-no is thus consistently associated with conflict, regardless of
the type of conflict.
(6) Kah-kodj-wokarrun kanihdja, nunh yirru, boyenj kah-yidjnjan. Kangu-no-kah.
he-head-tell:RECIP;PR there this fight big he>him-have:PR belly-his-LOC
Lit. ‘He’s talking to himself in his head there, he’s got this fight, a big one. In his belly.’
Free ‘He’s got a dilemma there, he’s got this fight, a big one. In his belly.’
Kangu-no as the locus and medium of emotions, moods and conflicts
The semantics of kangu (reflected in its Kriol counterpart binji) connects with inter-
personal relationships, emotions and conflicts. Furthermore, example (6) mentioned
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previously indicates that (some) speakers conceive of the belly as the actual locus of
emotions, and this is confirmed in example (7), a mix of Kriol and English.
(7) Well see, me sometimes, when I have funny feelings langa mai binji.
LOC my belly
‘Well see, me sometimes, when I have funny feelings in my belly.’
Thus, the belly, binji in Kriol, kangu-no in Dalabon, may be understood as the
locus of emotions and moods, dispositions related to some external events, interper-
sonal relationships in particular, whether they are positive (affection) or negative
(animosity). There is an apparent emphasis on animosity: in some contexts, kangu is
associated with conflict in itself. This emphasis may reflect a strong cultural concern
for social conflict, particularly among women. A plausible interpretation is that
conflict (especially involving kin) may be regarded as the primary social and moral
disorder and therefore the predominant emotion affecting one’s kangu-no. In
example (3), the speaker’s (repeated) concern for my interpersonal conflicts with my
own acquaintance (a white person very close to the speaker) is a sample of her
constant concerns about the fluidity of relationships between persons closely related
to her.
The properties of kangu-no determine one’s temper
It seems that kangu-no is not only considered the locus of some affects, but also
their medium. The verbs kangu-kurduhmu and kangu-run (example 1) associate the
belly with an uncomfortable situation and with tears, respectively. The belly is not
described as sheltering emotions in these cases; it is represented linguistically as
affected by emotions. Likewise, as shown in example (8), the representation of the
resolution of a conflict involves one’s stomach becoming soft, fluid, as indicated by
the verb kangu-yerrkmu, literally kangu + ‘slip’, translated as ‘forgive’, ‘apologise’,
and more generally ‘get rid of aggression and resentment’.
(8) Malung narrah-ngurrngdurrun, kardu dah-ngurrngdung
before you.two-hate:RECIP:PR maybe you>he-hate:PR
mah njing yibung mah kardu djah-ngurrngdun,
and you him and maybe he>you-hate:PR
kenbo kanh kah-lng-kangu-yerrkmu.
then that.one he-then-kangu-slip:PR
Lit. ‘You used to hate each other, maybe, you would hate him and him, he would hate you
as well, and then his belly becomes fluid again.’
Free ‘You used to hate each other, maybe, you would hate him and him, he would hate you
as well, and then he gets rid of his animosity, he’s ready to apologise.’
M. Ponsonnet
376 ª 2010 Australian Anthropological Society
Following the same trend, further material properties associated linguistically
with the belly connote not only one’s mood on a specific occasion, but one’s tem-
per, one’s character and personality, independent of a particular situation. The verb
kangu-yowyow, literally kangu + ‘flow’, repeating the fluidity metaphor, provides a
good example. Kangu-yowyow, illustrated in example (9), can be said of someone
who has a good, reliable temper, who is open to others.
(9) Laik, bulu kah-nan biyi kirdikird bulkah-marne-kangu-yowyow.
like they he-see:PR men women he>they-BENEF-kangu-flow;REDUP
Djehneng kah-yin radjdjarr. Mak bulka-njirrkmi-won.
as.if he-say flood.water neg he>they:IRR-hatred-give:PR
‘Like, she comes across men and women and she is kind to them.
You’d reckon flood water. She doesn’t have any hatred for anyone.’
When someone is not kind and generous, she is said to be kangu-murduk, kangu
+ ‘hard’. The adjective kangu-murduk, often translated as ‘had binji’ (<Engl. ‘hard’)
in Kriol, describes someone ‘selfish’, not inclined to share with others—whether it
be belongings, time, jokes, as shown in example (10).
(10) Kah-kangu-murdumurduk-kun.
he-kangu-hard;REDUP-GEN
Laik had filin laik kardu, kardu kah-durruniyan, kardu…
Like hard feeling like maybe maybe he-argue:FUT maybe
Munu kah-dja-ni yibungkarn, im ron.
intention.privative he-just-be:PR himself him one.self
‘He’s got a hard belly. Like hard feelings, like maybe, maybe he’ll
keep having arguments, maybe. He just stays there, by himself, all
by himself.’
In these examples, it was clear from the context but also from the tone that
kangu-yowyow was a positive description and kangu-murduk a negative one. But
interestingly, murduk in kangu-murduk sometimes gets translated in Kriol as ‘strong’
rather than ‘had’, with kangu-murduk gaining a positive meaning: ‘brave’, ‘coura-
geous’ (particularly in social situations). Example (11) describes, also with a positive
tone, a ‘strong personality’.
(11) Im breibwan, im kin dangfait.
he brave he can tongue.fight
Kah-djong-bruh, mak ka-djong-mun.
he-fear-dry neg he:IRR-fear-become:PR
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Bulah-dungiyan mak ka-djong-muniyan.
they>him-abuse:FUT neg he:IRR-fear-become:FUT
Kangu-murduk. Im sten fo det fait.
kangu-strong he stand for that fight
Lit. ‘He’s brave, he can fight with his tongue. He’s without fear, he’s not scared. If they
abuse him, he won’t get scared. Strong belly. He stands for fight.’
Free ‘He’s brave, he knows how to argue. If they abuse him, he won’t get scared.
A strong personality. He stands up to fight.
Hence, remarkably, the same word may be used to criticise a selfish person and
to praise a person being brave in social contexts. Kangu-murduk seems to be inade-
quate when one’s bravery is not social. The expression yang-murduk (‘content of
speech’ + ‘strong’), ‘verbally strong’, once used to explain kangu-murduk, confirms
that kangu-murduk applies to social situations. We will see how speakers deal with
this ambivalence of kangu-murduk in the discussion of yolh, later in the text.
Kangu-murduk, understood as ‘had binji’, ‘hard belly’, ‘selfish’, contrasts with
the adjective kangu-bolabola. Bola does not exist as a lexeme but is used, for
instance, in kurlah-bolabola ‘skin’ + ‘soft’, describing the tender skin of the inside
forearm. Kangu-bolabola describes generous persons prompt to share with others
(daily things such as food, radio sets and so on), as in example (12), where the
speaker proudly applies it to herself. Kangu-bolabola can also be said of someone
who enjoys the presence of others—a happy, funny, enjoyable person.
(12) Nunda mani nunh ngah-ngabbun kenbo bolah-ngabbuyan.
this.time money this I>him-give:PR then they>he-give:FUT
Ngey ngah-kangu-bolabola.
me I-kangu-sensitive;REDUP
Lit. ‘This is when I give money, then they give. Personally, I have a sensitive belly.’
Free ‘This is when I give money, then they give. Personally, I am a generous, giving person.’
Kangu-yerrkmu (kangu + ‘slip’), kangu-yowyow (kangu + ‘flow’), kangu-bola-
bola (kangu + ‘soft’ ⁄ ’sensitive’), kangu-burrama (kangu + ‘good’), kangu-murduk
(kangu + ‘hard’ or ‘strong’), kangu-weh (kangu + ‘bad’) all describe one’s temper,
personality—tendencies in one’s interactions with others. These expressions are all
interconnected: speakers use one to define others, by contrast or association. One
is made ⁄ considered a happy person because she enjoys the presence of others and
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is therefore good company; enjoying aloneness is associated with selfishness, sad-
ness and unhappiness. Higher value is put on being generous, on sharing and
enjoying the presence of others. This preference was once expressed by two inter-
viewees bursting into a delighted chorus when I eventually uttered ‘kah-kangu-
yowyow’, ‘her belly flows’ (a sentence to study which they chose to hear as a
statement), just after our discussing ‘kangu-murduk’, ‘being selfish’. This ethical
framework matches what Myers describes as an emphasis on relatedness, the
defining connection of individuals sharing with one another within the social
group, as opposed to autonomy, the individual’s specificity and independence.
The ambivalence of kangu-murduk, meaning both ‘selfish’ and ‘courageous’ in
social conflicts, constitutes an interesting exception to the coherence of the
system.
Several of the expressions mentioned previously rely on a representation of the
belly (or possibly the stomach) as more or less soft ⁄fluid vs. hard ⁄ solid. The struc-
ture of language is not in itself a sign that speakers do actually hold the fluidity of
one’s stomach to determine one’s personality. Indeed, the figure is not realistic, as
body parts cannot, strictly speaking, be fluid. But one can imagine them as more or
less soft and malleable: fluidity and malleability unite in their opposition to hard-
ness. And in fact, there is some evidence that speakers do endorse a fluidity ⁄
malleability representation of the belly.
First, Kriol definitions of kangu-murduk used the Kriol had, literally ‘hard’, or
strong, ‘strong’, with strong being used to describe hard ground. This recurrence in
Kriol is a sign that the morpheme murduk does retain its original semantic value
here. More importantly, kangu-yowyow was explained by a very explicit comparison
with flood water. This comparison sounds like a cultural trope, as shown by the
recurrent and more or less reified comparison with flood water exemplified in (9),
repeated later:
(9) Laik, bulu kah-nan biyi kirdikird bulkah-marne-kangu-yowyow.
Djehneng kah-yin radjdjarr. Mak bulka-njirrkmi-won.
‘Like, she comes across men and women and she is kind to them. You’d reckon
flood water. She doesn’t have any hatred for anyone.’
Crucially, both major female consultants separately described a secular ritual15
whereby a young infant was dragged on her belly over the sand from the top to the
bottom of the river bank, and her belly was rubbed with sand. The water then flo-
wed over the bank (during rain season), making the baby kangu-bolabola, a gener-
ous, happy person, who ‘never says no to anybody’. Symbolically, the fluidity of the
sand and water are transferred to the baby’s belly thanks to massaging—which, in
itself, can also render the belly malleable. Thus, the representations displayed by the
semantics of Dalabon did correspond to material actions in ritual practises. Individ-
uals’ tempers and personalities, their ability to interact with others in an ethically
appropriate manner, are understood to be related at least symbolically, to properties
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of their bellies, mainly fluidity or malleability as opposed to hardness. It should be
noted that the properties of the sand and water may be regarded, in the ritual, as
both symbolic and material. They are real material properties and stand as symbolic
tokens for such properties. Material manipulations upon the belly, activating sym-
bolic representations of physical properties, are considered adequate actions to make
the child a good person.
An interface between the person and the outside world
Kangu sometimes occurs in contexts that do not match any of the uses described
previously. The most salient case is the expression kangu-barrhmu, kangu +
‘crack’, which means ‘have a fright’, ‘have a shock’, ‘be very surprised’ by
something. An occurrence of kangu-weh referring to a bad feeling that was, in
fact, a premonition also indicates that kangu may be understood as the receptacle
of external events affecting the interface between the person and the outside
world. This does make sense in connection with the idea that the belly is the
locus of interpersonal emotions and affects because in the Dalabon universe, inter-
actions with others are the most prominent aspect of one’s interactions with the
environment.
To summarise, we may state that the semantics of kangu in Dalabon correlates
with the fact that kangu-no, the belly, is regarded as the locus of interpersonal emo-
tions (the kind of emotions described by Myers in the Pintupi context), linked to
affection or animosity—with an emphasis on conflict. Kangu-no is not only linguis-
tically depicted as the locus of interpersonal emotions, but also as their medium.
The belly (or stomach) is affected when one experiences an emotion. Its material
properties, its being fluid or malleable as opposed to harder, determine one being
more or less open to others, more or less socially valuable. This representation of
the physical properties of the belly is echoed by accounts of manipulations under-
taken on young infants, involving sand and flowing water as symbols and instances
of fluidity, to make the infant’s belly more fluid and malleable so that she grows as
good-tempered. Further, kangu-no seems to be considered the receptacle of what
comes from outside more generally—an interface between the person and the exter-
nal world (other human beings constituting the most important part of the external
world for Dalabon individuals). To the extent that kangu-no is conceived of as an
interface between the person and the outside world, it seems that Dalabon speakers’
constructs of the belly play an important part in what has earlier been called ‘emo-
tions’. Indeed, emotions were defined as observable, ‘reachable’ phenomena (as
opposed to ‘unreachable’ private feelings) standing at the interface between an indi-
vidual and the world. Because Dalabon value relatedness to others, one’s kangu-no
primarily shelters emotions triggered by interpersonal interactions—that is, emo-
tions of the sort emphasised by Myers in the Pintupi context. I will now describe
meanings and uses of yolh-no, thus shedding light on Dalabon speakers’ conceptions
of private feelings, of the self as an autonomous entity.
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YOLH
Feelings
As a first approximation, yolh-no may translate as ‘filin’ in Kriol and ‘feelings’ in
English. Just like kangu, it is used to describe either good or bad feelings. Yolh-
burrama (yolh + ‘good’) and yolh-weh (yolh + ‘bad’) express moods in a similar
fashion to kangu-burrama ⁄ kangu-weh in Dalabon, gudbinji ⁄nogudbinji in Kriol. In
some contexts, expressions including yolh seem nearly interchangeable with expres-
sions using kangu. This is the case in example (13), where yolh-weh describes the
mood of a loner, who stays away from others. Example (13) compares with example
(10), where the speaker refers to a similar situation but uses kangu-murduk (kangu +
‘hard’, ‘selfish’). It may be noted that in example (13), in contrast to example (10),
the speaker sounded compassionate rather than judgemental.
(13) Kardu kah-yolh-weh, kah-nini kanihdja kardu kah-yolh-weh!
maybe he-yolh-bad he-stay;REDUP:PR there maybe he-yolh-bad
Lit. ‘He might have a bad yolh, he just stays there [by himself], maybe he’s got a bad yolh!’
Free ‘He might be in a bad mood, he just stays there [by himself], maybe he is melancholic!’
Yolh is also found in expressions such as yolh-yerrkmu, yolh + ‘slip’, apparently
a synonym of kangu-yerrkmu. Not all kangu compounds transfer to yolh, or vice
versa,16 but the fluidity property of kangu-no partly applies to yolh-no as well. Con-
sistently, this figure is extended via the idea of entanglement, with an expression
apparently specific to yolh: yolh-dukkarrun, yolh + ‘tangled up’, translated in Kriol
as ‘worimbat’ (<Eng. ‘worry’), ‘fil sori’ (<Eng. ‘feel sorry’). In example (14), yolh-
dukkarrun conveys the idea of anxiety, typically the anxiety that is said to make one
sick when worrying about deceased people for too long (a culturally typical
scenario).
(14)Nunhmunguyh ngaye-ningiyan, ngaye-bengkiyan, nunh wunga-yeluˆng-moyh-rakkan.
this all.the.time I:SUB-stay:FUT I>him:SUB-know:FUT this I:APPR-then-sick-fall:PR
Yolh-ngan wunga-yolh-dukkarrun.
yolh-my I:APPR-yolh-tie.up:RECIP:PR
Lit. ‘If I remain by myself inactive all the time, if I think about it all the time, then I will
get sick. My yolh, my yolh will get entangled.’
Free ‘If I remain by myself inactive all the time, if I think about it all the time, then I will
get sick. My feelings, I might become anxious.’
In example (14), the source of anxiety was, again, the speaker’s concern about a
close family member being sick. However, yolh-dukkarrun refers to what happens to
the person herself and the way her health is affected from the inside if she stays
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withdrawn from others and from worldly activities. While yolh and kangu expres-
sions are often interchangeable, here yolh-dukarrun is not equivalent to a kangu
compound: yolh connotes what happens to the person proper, in the culturally typi-
cal scenario when she unhealthily focuses on her own feeling of sorrow. The entan-
glement metaphor recalls fluidity, but in that case, the feeling results from the
absence of interpersonal, and broadly speaking external impacts. As we shall see,
this idea that yolh connotes private feelings of the person is confirmed by further
uses of yolh.
Desires and appetites
Yolh can be described as good or bad: good yolh is associated with good moods,
bad yolh with bad moods. Yolh is thus treated as a neutral component, with its
value yet to be qualified. But yolh may also bear a slightly different connotation.
For instance, the verb yolh-wudj, yolh + ‘finish off’, describes the absence of cheer-
fulness, a low and depressed mood. This lack of enthusiasm contrasts with yolh-ni,
yolh + ‘be’, which often means ‘feel like’. In this framework, being deprived of yolh
amounts to an absence of enthusiasm, of gusto, and yolh, rather than being neutral,
connotes higher, positive moods. Example (15) makes the connection of yolh with
appetites and drives very explicit.
(15) Ngah-yolh-wudj, nunh mak [nga-nguniyan].
I-yolh-finish.off:PR this neg [I>he:IRR-eat:FUT]
Lit. ‘If if my yolh is finished off, then I won’t [eat].’
Free ‘If I’ve got no appetite, then I won’t [eat].’
In other instances, yolh-wudj (yolh + ‘finish’) is explained thanks to Kriol
expressions: ‘im don wana laf’, literally ‘he doesn’t feel like laughing’, ‘ai no hepi’,
literally ‘I’m not happy’. Lacking appetite and not being cheerful or happy are cul-
turally equivalent in that context. They are all consequences of yolh-wudj, having no
yolh, no pep, which results in being morose, serious, depressed (see example 14). In
such cases, yolh is not neutral but denotes positive feelings, positive drives, rather
than feelings generally. In line with this interpretation, yolh is used in some transla-
tions of what English describes as love. Yolh, as a root, may nonetheless be used to
form expressions related to negative or lower moods, because the absence of drives,
or unsettled drives, results in undesirable states (depression, anxiety, etc.).
A lot more could be said about yolh and yolh-no, but we may now articulate a
hypothesis. While kangu-no designates the interface between the person and her
(natural and social) environment, yolh and yolh-no seem to refer to moods under-
stood as specifically personal—the set of one’s drives, stemming from ‘inside’ the
person. These moods are not seen primarily as consequences of interactions with
others (or with the environment), but as resulting from events within the person,
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as in example (14). Additionally, the contrast between examples (10) and (13) tells
us about the values governing the range of affects connected to yolh-no and to
kangu-no, respectively. Both sentences describe a loner who likes to stay away from
others. Example (10) uses a kangu compound (kangu-murduk, kangu + ‘hard’),
describes a social situation, and is quite explicitly judgemental: one should not keep
away from others. Example (13) uses a yolh compound (yolh-weh, yolh + ‘bad’) and
sounds compassionate rather than judgemental: the speaker describes someone sub-
ject to an unexplainable and incontrollable ‘melancholy’. This contrast indicates
that, in the domain of yolh, individuals enjoy greater autonomy to borrow a term
used by Myers to refer to the possibility that one may act as an independent entity.
The moods related to yolh-no, freed from the constraints of relatedness, are rooted
and dealt with within the individual and belong to the person proper. To that
extent, they correspond to what was earlier called ‘feelings’.
Yolh-no as what is specific to the self
Here again, the hypothesis articulated on the basis of the semantic structure of
Dalabon confirms that speakers do explicitly associate yolh-no with individuals’
autonomy. In example (16), the speaker defines yolh-no as the eminently and purely
subjective component of the person. Her assertive tone emphasises the value put on
autonomy, enacted as the right for one to be different—precisely, in her sentence,
the right to not feel good, to be unhappy (we have seen that being happy, or at
least cheerful and of good company, was morally praised in the domain of interper-
sonal relationships and dominated by the values of relatedness).
(16) Yolh-no nunh im ⁄ oni yolh-no na. Laik blanga im filin.
yolh-his this it [false start] only yolh-his there like POSS him feelings
Hau im fil. Im matbi nogud filin, im difren brom enibodi.
how he feel:PR he maybe bad feelings he different from anybody
‘His yolh, this is ⁄ only his yolh there. Like, his feelings. How he feels. He might feel
bad, he’s different from anyone else.’
Additionally, while in spontaneous translations speakers usually translate yolh-no
with Kriol ‘filin’, the same speaker, when prompted to explain yolh-no, suggests a
more refined translation, namely ‘wil’ (<Engl. ‘will’). Wil is not very frequent in
Kriol, and considering the speaker’s limited mastery of English, what she means is
not transparent. Nonetheless, if we lend to wil a semantic value more or less equiva-
lent to the value of will, this definition remains amazingly consistent with example
(16). Thus, we may safely conclude that yolh-no, one’s pep, the set of one’s drives
and appetites, of one’s private feelings, stemming from inside the self as opposed to
socially triggered emotions, is regarded as a defining element of the person, of the
independent individual.
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The autonomy of yolh-no
While the root yolh may be used to denote moods like kangu does, these items are
well differentiated. Yolh-no may be understood as the set of one’s private feelings,
as well as one’s pep or gusto, the set of one’s positive drives—feelings, desires,
appetites, love. As the absence of drives may entail negative moods, yolh may also
be used to express moroseness, melancholy, anxiety. (Some) speakers explicitly
associate yolh-no with the specificities of one’s personality or will, that is, with the
individual’s independence and autonomy. The domain of private feelings is thus
associated with personal psychological well-being (happiness, enthusiasm and their
counterparts, depression, lack of desire, melancholy etc.) and conceived of as inde-
pendent of social order and values.
The assertion of one’s right to be different in example (16) and the absence of
judgement in the ‘yolh related’ description of a loner in example (13) demonstrate
that autonomy is not ethically dismissed at all times. This is puzzling in comparison
with the values enforcing relatedness, firmly asserted in the evaluation and control
(by means of ritual manipulations) of people’s tempers. The analysis of kangu had
led to the conclusion that the Dalabon, matching Myers’s description of the Pin-
tupi, largely places ethical value in relatedness and connection with others. Indeed,
Myers (1986) identifies a tension between autonomy and relatedness in the Pintupi
context. But I have not observed any significant tension with Dalabon speakers.
Socially oriented emotions mediated by kangu-no and individual feelings, yolh-no,
rooted in the private self, do not seem to stand in opposition. Rather, these sets of
values seem to operate on parallel planes. Within the hours of conversations I have
recorded (and the rest of the time), the legitimacy of one’s yolh-no was never
denied—it was, in fact, acknowledged. And importantly, the ambivalence between
kangu-murduk as ‘hard belly’, ‘selfish’ (example 10) and kangu-murduk as ‘strong
belly’, ‘standing up for his view’ (example 11) remained unnoticed by the speaker
even when the confrontation neared the surface. The negative evaluation of kangu-
murduk relies on values of relatedness; the positive evaluation of kangu-murduk
relies on values of autonomy. As the polysemy may go unnoticed, I am tempted to
conclude that Dalabon speakers can be indifferent to what we perceive as a contra-
diction between these two sets of values. We are thus left with the problem of
understanding the omnipresence of interpersonal relationships in a way that
explains how the expected tension with personal autonomy may be avoided.
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN KANGU-NO AND YOLH-NO
Echoing the semantic overlap between kangu and yolh, some speakers talk of yolh-
no as if it were located in the belly, or even as if it were the belly. In such cases,
yolh-no and kangu-no are more or less conflated, reflecting the fact that both terms
can translate as ‘binji’ in Kriol. However, the matter is not clear cut. A female
speaker explicitly rejected this equation. Several speakers, when asked to point at
the yolh-no on the drawing of a (male) human body showing the organs as in the
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local ‘X-ray style’ paintings, located yolh-no in the brain—fewer speakers located
yolh-no in the belly or along the spine. One female speaker stated that yolh-no was
not on the drawing—presumably because she considered it immaterial, not an
organ that could be drawn.17 But she also added, ‘oni jis kangu-no dedsol’, ‘only his
kangu-no that’s all’. This was, of course, induced by my asking where the kangu-no
was just before. But we had been listing various body parts, and listening to the
recording, it is hard not to imagine her reasoning along the following lines: yolh-no,
being immaterial, cannot be represented on the drawing; thus, we can only see the
associated organ, kangu-no. The same speaker uttered example (17) about the sand
and water ritual on the infants’ belly, assuming that the manipulations operated on
the infant’s kangu-no impact on her yolh-no.
(17) Kah-dja-lng-kangu-burrama. Kah-kangu-yowyowmu.
he-just-then-kangu-good he-kangu-flow;REDUP:PR
Mak ka-yolh-borledmu, mak ka-run.
neg he:IRR-yolh-change:PR neg he:IRR-cry:PR
‘She is good kangu. She’s got an easy, fluid kangu.
She doesn’t have unstable yolh, she’s doesn’t cry.’
The question of the exact connection between kangu-no and yolh-no is intricate
and deserves dedicated research. Yolh-no and kangu-no are distinct; some speakers,
in some circumstances, locate yolh-no in the belly, but this is far from systematic.
Nonetheless, some speakers clearly (if implicitly) establish some physiological con-
nections between kangu-no and yolh-no, as in example (17). Although the nature of
this connection remains vague, this example provides an interesting insight.
The above-mentioned quote followed the description of the ritual whereby an
infant’s kangu-no is made fluid and malleable, resulting in her becoming a good,
generous person, but the speaker mentions consequences for the infant’s yolh-no as
well. We thus face the following configuration. Kangu-no is a body part or internal
organ. On the one hand, it is represented linguistically as a malleable (literally
depicted as fluid) bodily interface, affected by external events (primarily inter-
personal relationships, in this cultural context), triggering many socially framed and
socially oriented emotions. On the other hand, kangu-no is connected to one’s yolh-
no, one’s set of private feelings. Hence, kangu-no may, in fact, be understood as the
malleable interface connecting the private self to the outer world. This can be made
sense of in two ways. Explicitly, one’s kangu-no being malleable means that she is
sensitive to others, a highly valued personality feature. Less explicitly, the fact that
her kangu-no is malleable also means that the properties of one’s kangu-no can be
modified by means of physical manipulations, as we have seen with ritual manipu-
lations. And via one’s kangu-no, such manipulations eventually impact on one’s
yolh-no. This understanding of the nature of kangu-no is in line with the phenom-
ena described by Keen (2006) as ‘extensions of the person in space and time’. Keen
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explains how some bodily substances and body parts may be considered extensions
of the person and can be made to act upon someone (via sorcery), from a distance.
While there is no concept of extension in our case, the external world is allowed to
penetrate and modify the most private aspect of the person by means of physical
action upon an organ conceived of as a malleable interface, an interface which
external influences—and crucially, social influences—may reach.
We have seen that, in spite of this permeability of the person, personal auton-
omy is well acknowledged and recognised as such. In the Western, Cartesian tradi-
tion, feelings that define the ‘subject’ may be partly controlled, mainly thanks to the
power of the mind—that is, via rational thinking. In the conceptual, or symbolic,
model observed with Dalabon speakers, the subject may also be reached ‘materially’
speaking: actions operated on the body may indeed impact on the mind as well. In
this conceptual framework, just as in the Cartesian framework, the autonomy of the
self is acknowledged, and in both cases, it may be partly controlled. But the means
by which it is controlled, and the related conceptions of the body, of the mind, of
reasons and affects, of what is material and immaterial and of the interactions
between such components, vary significantly.
SOME CONCLUSIONS
Many of our findings do echo Myers’s description of the Pintupi ‘emotional land-
scape’. Nonetheless, the reservation about Myers’s (1979) radical opposition
between a dismissed private sphere and a morally valued public sphere is apparently
grounded. Such a sharp opposition is not to be found in the Dalabon context. The
tension between autonomy and relatedness described by Myers (1986) does not
seem to occur among the Dalabon. These spheres tend to evolve independently with
respect to moral judgements; judgements stemming from different spheres do not
collide. From the point of view of the person, they appear as interconnected, as the
self is defined by both kangu-no and yolh-no, which are physiologically intercon-
nected. Practically, however, interpersonal relationships cover literally every aspect
of (female) Dalabon life—but this does not undermine the right for one to claim
her feelings and live by them. But how can we explain and interpret the omnipres-
ence of social interactions so that it does not result in a tension with the value of
autonomy? Before we can answer this question, we shall have to describe the episte-
mological features associated with this omnipresence of interpersonal relations.
The second reservation, related to the cultural specificity of the supposedly Wes-
tern concern for private feelings, seems grounded too. Indeed, Dalabon semantics,
practises and representations do display a distinction that mirrors the distinction
between emotions and feelings. The belly, kangu-no, is represented as an interface
between the person and the world and is thus the locus of something akin to emo-
tions. Indeed, the emotions mediated by one’s kangu-no may be considered bodily
reactions (matching the neuroscientific conception), or they may be described in
terms of social situations (matching the anthropological conception). One’s yolh-no,
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on the other hand, encompasses the affects stemming from one’s own, private
nature—reflecting the reference to private, non-observable feelings. This distinction
is not strictly identical to the Western emotions ⁄ feelings distinctions, but it does bear
resemblances. An obvious difference is that, within the system I have described, the
self is also defined by its materiality, via the properties of one’s kangu-no, impacting
in turn on one’s yolh-no. In ‘Western’, Cartesian conceptual models, the ‘essence’ of
the self is either considered immaterial, or reduced to physical properties (the neuro-
scientists’ model). In the ‘Dalabon system’, the self is the body as well as the mind.
As a consequence, what Wittgenstein calls the ‘beetle’ is assigned a different
position in this system of language games. As we have seen, in the parabola, the
‘beetle’ stands for private feelings reified as objects of reference. According to Witt-
genstein, the question of the existence of such private feelings lies outside the scope
of our language games: our ‘beetle’ does not enter our world. But this (standard)
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s writings does not account for the fact that the figure
of the ‘beetle’ does keep coming back in our language games. Interestingly, it seems
that Dalabon language games present us with a different perspective on this
dilemma. They do, indirectly, incorporate the ‘beetle’ into their social interactions,
via ritual manipulations whereby private feelings may be physically affected. In such
a social, symbolic game, the self and her feelings are reachable objects. This suggests
an alternative way of solving the ‘beetle’ problem, the problem of the integration of
feelings and the private self within a conceptual and social system.
NOTES
1 My expression.
2 Whether there is such an entity as a ‘Dalabon group’, and what it is, can be questioned.
In this paper, this expression generally refers to ‘the descendants of Dalabon speakers’.
3 Damasio distinguishes two stages of consciousness of feelings, but this is not relevant to
our argument.
4 And they do not match the respective semantic categories of feelings and emotions in
daily language either.
5 Myers refers to Peirce, but Wittgenstein and Peirce are very compatible.
6 I take the opportunity to thank AIATSIS for funding my research projects. I am particu-
larly grateful to Sarah Cutfield and Tony Boxall. I also thank Nick Evans and my anony-
mous reviewers. My greatest thanks are for Dalabon speakers, in particular Maggie
Tukumba and Lily Bennett. Warm thanks to Salome Harris for conversation and advise.
7 See Evans and Merlan (2004), Evans et al. (2004), Cutfield (in prep.), Evans et al.
(2004) for details of Dalabon grammar and vocabulary.
8 Quinn and Holland (1987), and other authors in this volume, refer to ‘cultural models’
and not to ‘conceptual models’. I prefer my formula, which is free of the assumption
that members of a social group share the same model, or what is called a ‘culture’. In
my view, while there would be ‘family resemblances’ between the conceptual models
used by members of one social group, we should bear in mind that these models are
unlikely to be identical or to respond to any set of ‘cultural rules’.
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9 Some aspects of Dalabon culture may remain inaccessible to one or the other
gender—mostly to women.
10 See Evans and Merlan (2001), Cutfield (in prep.) for details about this complex
phenomenon.
11 The sixth speaker implicitly agreed with this scope, while defining kangu-no as the whole
thorax.
12 The meaning of darrmu is yet to be clarified.
13 Abbreviations: [pers.x]>[pers.y], x is agent, y is object; APPR, apprehensive mood (if Ø,
then the mood is realis); BENEF, benefactive case; COM, comitative case; DAT, dative
case; ELAT, elative case; FUT, future tense; high, object is a human being or a being
classified as higher than agent; interj, interjection; IRR, irrealis mood (if Ø, then the
mood is realis); LOC, locative case; neg, negation; PI, past imperfective; POSS, possessive
case; PP, past perfective; PR, present tense; RECIP, reciprocal verbal form; REDUP,
reduplication; SUB, item represent the argument(s) of subordinate clause (if Ø item is
the function of main clause).
14 The root kodj, which approximates to ‘head’, is used to describe intellectual states or
processes (Ponsonnet 2009).
15 The speaker reported having operated these manipulations on her own children and
grandchildren. However, since 1998, I have never heard of this ritual being per-
formed—although I am usually notified of initiation rituals and other ceremonies.
16 Exactly which expressions may be used with both remains to be thoroughly
documented.
17 See Ponsonnet (2009) for a similar reaction about men-no, the set of one’s thoughts.
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